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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
AGAINST COERCED SELF-INCRIMINATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
A commentator once observed that the United States produces three
major exports: "rock music, blue jeans and United States law."1
Increasingly, nonresident aliens are being subjected to our criminal
laws,2 and although these laws extend around the world, the degree to
which the Bill of Rights apply extraterritorially has yet to be
determined.3
As the United States government expands its law enforcement
activities to combat drug trafficking, terrorism, and other international
crimes, the extent to which the Bill of Rights applies extraterritorially
becomes a crucial issue to aliens accused of violating United States
criminal laws. In United States v. Yunis,4 the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause has extraterritorial effect was
resolved in favor of a nonresident alien defendant. However, two years
ago, the Supreme Court implied in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
that constitutional protections for criminal defendants do not extend past
national boundaries.
In Yunis, Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese citizen, was accused of hijacking
a Jordanian airplane in 1985. He was later brought to trial in the United
States. 6 While the government never contested the application of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to
Yunis, a special concurring opinion by Judge Mikva discusses this issue
and provides insight into why the full protection of the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause should apply to Yunis and other
defendants like him.
7
* I wish to express my deepest appreciation for the guidance of the Honorable
Robinson 0. Everett, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals (Ret.).
1. V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States
Law, 14 INTL LAW. 257, 257 (1980).
2. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279-81 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
3. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Op THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES
§ 721 cmt. b (19871 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
4. United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
5. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264-75. The Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez
considered the question of "whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure
by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a
foreign country." Id. at 261. The Court held that it does not. Id. The Court confined its
holding to the Fourth Amendment, but its rationale may be extended to other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 265.
6. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 954-57.
7. Id. at 970-71. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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In addition to Judge Mikva's concerns,8 other concerns exist.
Without the shield of the Fifth Amendment, nonresident alien
defendants could be subject to the entire range of abuses against which
the Fifth Amendment was designed to guard.' By providing an
opportunity for these abuses to occur, the courts, in effect, would be
approving a shortcut to guilt which has long been disfavored by the
law.1" Furthermore, endorsement of a policy which would not extend
constitutional protections to nonresident aliens discriminates against
defendants on the basis of their nationality."
This Note argues that the Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination should apply to nonresident aliens when
they are arrested by United States law enforcement officials and brought
to the United States for trial. Part II briefly lays out the factual
background of the Fawaz Yunis case and the reasoning of Judge Mikva's
special concurrence. Part III provides a brief introduction to minimalism
and maximalism, two competing theories in this area of constitutional
jurisprudence. Part IV offers both substantive and policy-related reasons
to support the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment
protection against compelled self-incrimination. Finally, Part V offers
some concluding remarks on the likely path the United States Supreme
Court will take on this issue.
II. THE CASE OF FAWAZ YUNIS
In 1985, a party of armed men stormed Royal Jordanian Airlines
Flight 402 shortly before it left Beirut.2 The hijackers intended to fly to
Tunis, but Tunisian officials denied their request to land and the
hijackers were forced to return to Beirut where they released the
passengers and crew members unharmed. The hijackers then blew up
the plane and escaped into the city.'
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified Yunis as the
probable leader of the hijackers. In their efforts to obtain jurisdiction
8. See discussion infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
9. The Fifth Amendment was designed to safeguard defendants against transgressions
by the United States Government, such as coerced confessions and forced self-incrimination on
the witness stand. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 259,
260-65 (1988) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT]. See generally, LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE FIFMH AMENDMENT (1986) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINS] (an exhaustive historical account
of the Fifth Amendment).
10. See infra note 129.
11. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
12. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 955. The plane carried seventy passengers and crew. Robin
Wright, Younis Is Found Guilty of Air Piracy, Hostage-Taking, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1989, at 1.
"American citizens were among the passengers on board ... , and thus the hijacking violated
American law." Yunis, 859 F.2d at 954.
13. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 955.
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over Yunis, FBI agents lured him to a yacht anchored in the
Mediterranean Sea with promises of a lucrative drug deal. When Yunis
boarded the ship, FBI agents arrested him. The yacht then rendezvoused
with the U.S.S. Butte, a munitions ship assigned to the Sixth Fleet.'4
Before Yunis was questioned, he was informed that he would have
the assistance of counsel once he was in the United States, and that he
would be accorded all the trial rights of a United States citizen.'" Next,
Yunis was given a card with Miranda warnings written on it in Arabic,
and these rights were read to him through an interpreter. 6 After being
interrogated nine times within twelve hours, with periodic interruptions
due to recurring seasickness, Yunis confessed to leading the hijacking' 7
and later signed a written statement confirming his role in the attack.
A D.C. District Court granted Yunis' motion to suppress the
confessions,19 holding that he did not waive either his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination20 or his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.2 ' On appeal by the United States Department of
Justice, the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed.' Judge Mikva, writing for
a unanimous panel, gave special attention to the fact that Yunis and the
government stipulated to the application of the Fifth Amendment, and
that during the interrogation, FBI agents behaved as though the Fifth
Amendment applied to Yunis.' However, Judge Mikva expressed
doubt as to whether a stipulation by the parties could resolve the Fifth
Amendment issue.24 His skepticism prompted a separate concurrence
in which he determined that the Fifth Amendment provisions concerning
interrogations applied to nonresident aliens arrested overseas.' He
relied on Bram v. United States,' where the Court excluded a confession
coerced by foreign agents.' Judge Mikva also developed an analogy
between Yunis' case and the use of testimony under grants of
immunity,2 noting that the Fifth Amendment protection against
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 956.
17. Id. at 956-57.
18. Id. at 957.
19. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 911, 929 (D. D.C. 1988).
20. Id. at 922.
21. Id. at 929.
22. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 954-55.
23. Id. at 954, 957.
24. Id. at 957 n.*.
25. Id. at 970-71.
26. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In Branz, a first officer was accused of
murdering his ship's captain. Id. at 537. The Supreme Court acknowledged Bram's Fifth
Amendment right without issue. Id. at 542.
27. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 971.
28. Id.
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compelled self-incrimination focuses on the use of compelled testimony
at trial.' Judge Mikva, in Yunis, wrote:
If it is true that an alien who is interrogated outside the territorial
United States cannot at that point claim fifth amendment rights then he
is in much the same position as a grand jury witness who has been
granted immunity and therefore has no fifth amendment ground for
refusing to testify."
More importantly, Judge Mikva's concurrence marks the first time that
the extraterritorial effect of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination has received direct treatment by the judiciary.
III. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
MINIMALISM VERSUS MAXIMALISM
Two theories currently vie for dominance in the area of
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. The minimalist approach
acknowledges little extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights. In
opposition, maximalism acknowledges few, if any, territorial limits.
A. The Era of Minimalism
In re Ross' introduced the concept of minimalism. In that case, a
United States consular court in Japan convicted John Ross, a United
States citizen, of murder. Ross challenged the conviction, arguing that
he had been denied his rights to a grand jury indictment and a trial by
jury.Y In sweeping language, the court held that Ross was not entitled
to those protections because of his presence abroad." Additionally, the
29. Id. The Supreme Court stated in New Jersey v. Portash that testimony under a grant
of immunity is essentially coerced testimony. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).
30. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 971.
31. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (also known as Ross v. McIntyre).
32. Id. at 461. A necessary part of Ross! argument was that the Constitution had
extraterritorial effect. See id. at 460.
33. Id. at 464.
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established "for the United States
of America," and not for countries outside of their limits. The guarantees it affords
against accusation of capital or infamous crimes, except by indictment or presentment
by a grand jury, and for an impartial trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only
to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for
alleged offences committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad. The Constitution can have no operation in another country.
Id. (citation omitted).
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court took notice of the practical problems that the government would
face if it were required to adhere to the rights of grand jury indictment
and trial by jury in a foreign country'3
Forty-five years later, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principles of Ross, but limited its
broad dicta.s The government indicted Curtiss-Wright for smuggling
guns into the United States, contrary to a joint Congressional and
Presidential Proclamation. The Court held that "[n]either the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have an force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens." Thus,
although the Court found only limited extraterritorial application of the
Constitution, it did extend the Constitution to reach United States
citizens abroad.
Johnson v. Eisentrageri also supports the minimalist approach. In
Johnson, a United States Military Commission' convicted twenty-one
German nationals, who had never been in United States territory, 9
under the laws of war shortly after the end of the Second World War.
On appeal, the defendants argued that their trials, convictions, and
imprisonment violated Articles I and I and the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.4' However, the Supreme Court rejected
their arguments noting that resident aliens lose their limited
constitutional rights while their nation is at war with the United
States.' The Court found this reasoning even more cogent when the
enemy defendant is a nonresident alien.' Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that granting the German defendants the protection of the Fifth
Amendment and the writ of habeas corpus would unduly "hamper the
war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy."'
On a broader scale, the Johnson Court focused on an "ascending scale
of rights as [an alien] increases his identity with our society."y This
analysis appears to reflect the Court's use of social compact theory as the
matrix for interpreting the extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
34. Id. at 464-65 ("The requirement of such a body to accuse and to try an offender
would, in a majority of cases, cause an abandonment of all prosecution ... [and] such a
requirement would defeat the main purpose of investing the consul with judicial authority.").
35. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
36. Id.
37. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
38. It is important to note that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendments applies in
trials before a Military Commission. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1942).
39. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 778.
40. Id. at 766.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 771-72.
43. Id. at 776.
44. Id. at 779.
45. Id. at 770.
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Under the social compact theory, citizens establish a government after
contracting with one another to form a body politic. 6 Minimalism
construes social compact theory to mean that only parties to the compact
(i.e., citizens) deserve the Constitution's protections.
B. The Rise of Maximalism
The theory of maximalism is rooted in the Supreme Court decision
of Reid v. Covert." Several courts have relied on Reid's broad
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution.49
Reid involved the overseas court-martial of two wives accused of
murdering their husbands who were military servicemen. The Supreme
Court held that military trials were unconstitutional because the
defendants received neither the right to grand jury indictment nor trial
by petit jury.5
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the defendants'
convictions. First, Justice Black reaffirmed that the United States
government is entirely "a creature of the Constitution.... It can only
act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution."' Therefore, if United States government agents act
against a United States citizen abroad, they must adhere to constitutional
strictures&' Furthermore, Justice Black found an intent for the Bill of
Rights to travel with the government "when it acts outside of this
country, as well as here at home,"s in accordance with the language of
Article Ell, Section 2 of the Constitution. He decried picking and
choosing between provisions that do and do not apply extraterritorially
to government action.54 Finally, Justice Black strictly qualified In re
46. See Donald L. Doemberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52,59-61 (1985). For a discussion
of social compact theory, see infra part IV.
47. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan I, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal
Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 783-84 (1980) (arguing against extending Constitutional
protection to third parties to the social compact).
48. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
49. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 476 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Reid
to support the extraterritorial effect of the Fourth Amendment in Puerto Rico); Examining Board
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976) (citing Reid to support the extraterritorial effect of
the Fourth Amendment); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,261 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring
and dissenting in part) (Reid "makes clear that the United States Constitution extends beyond
our territorial boundaries... and applies within all foreign areas where jurisdiction is or may
be exercised by the United States over its citizens.").
50. Reid, 354 U.S. at 1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6 ("[Ihe shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to
be in another land.").
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 9.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Ross: "The Ross case is one of those cases that cannot be understood
except in its peculiar setting; even then, it seems highly unlikely that a
similar result would be reached today."5
C. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: A Return to Minimalism
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez represents an apparent return to
minimalism by the judiciary. 6 Mexican officials arrested the
respondent, a Mexican citizen residing in Mexico, for drug trafficking.
He was brought to the United States border where United States
Marshals placed him in custody. Following the arrest, agents from the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Mexican Federal
Judicial Police searched Verdugo-Urquidez's home in Mexico. They
found evidence linking Verdugo-Urquidez to narcotics trafficking and
to the kidnapping and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique (Kiki)
Camarena SalazarY
Verdugo-Urquidez challenged the validity of the search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.' The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
held that the search of Verdugo-Urquidez's home did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment. 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the plurality
rationale in which he distinguished the Fifth Amendment as having a
different operation and language than that of the Fourth.' Drawing
upon the social compact theory, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the use of
the words "the people" in the Fourth Amendment to imply that some
protections in the Bill of Rights apply only to United States citizens.6'
Chief Justice Rehnquist read Reid v. Covert narrowly as applying abroad
only to United States citizens.' Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist read
existing cases on the rights of aliens in the United States to apply only
if an alien comes to the United States with the intent to reside here, not
in situations where they have been detained awaiting trial.'
55. Id. at 10. After citing other cases that directly repudiated Ross, Black admonished that
"[a]t best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era." Id. at 12.
56. United States v. Verdugo-Urqudez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For criticism of the opinion,
see Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run
Amok, 31 VA. J. INTL L. 151 (1991); Jon Andre Dobson, Note, A Move Away from the Belief in the
Universal Pre-existing Rights of All People, 36 S.D. L. REv. 120 (1991); Gail T. Kikawa, Note, How
the Majority Stumbled, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 369 (1991).
57. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262-63.
58. Id. at 263.
59. Id. at 274-75.
60. Id. at 264-65.
61. Id. at 265.
62. Id. at 269-70.
63. Id. at 271-72.
Spring 1992]
374 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST
SELF-INCRIINATION SHOULD APPLY ABROAD
There are many reasons to support the extraterritorial application of
the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination.
As set forth below, the protection against coerced confessions is a natural
right and should not be fettered by social compact analysis.
Furthermore, the cases supporting the minimalist approach should be
read narrowly. Additionally, the Constitution places a priori limits on
the actions by United States law enforcement agents which should apply
equally abroad. The rationales behind the protection against coerced
self-incrimination would be undercut if this protection did not apply to
nonresident alien defendants. Finally, applying the protection of the
Fifth Amendment is in accordance with norms of international law that
are recognized throughout the world.
A. Natural Rights Justifications
The proper point of departure for this discussion is to recognize that
the riht against coerced self-incrimination is one of the many natural
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. As early as 1776, the Virginia
Bill of Rights recognized the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination as an inalienable, natural right,' stating that "in all capital
or criminal prosecutions" no person could be "compelled to give
evidence against himself."" Furthermore, the Declaration of
Independence speaks of "self evident" truths and "unalienable rights."67
Thus, it follows that the Framers of the Constitution intended to protect
64. The term Natural Law
is defined as that self-evident law which, being grounded in an abstract-universal
innermost "nature" of things, including man and society, remains essentially ...
independent of convention or tradition; of legislation or judicial action; and of
historically developed social institutions or ideologies.... Natural Law not only
constitutes the a priori antecedent of every law or system of laws . . .but also
embodies the absolute source of every Positive Law and empirical legal order, as well
as the final criterion for testing the "righteousness" or validity of the Positive Law
"emanating," as it were, from this ideal law.
Anton-Hermann Chroust, On the Nature of Natural Law, in INTERPRETATiONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSonPIES 70, 70 (Paul Sayre ed., reprinted 1981).
65. "[AIU men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive
or divest their posterity .... ." VA. CONST. of 1776, BILL Op RIGHTS § 1, reprinted in SOURCES Op
OUR LIBERTIES 311, 311 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959) [hereinafter VA. BILL OF RIGHTS].
66. Id. § 8, at 312.
67. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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the rights of all individuals; or such a construction is at least possible
and perhaps even necessary.'
It may be argued that the Bill of Rights was not conceived as positive
law, where society is the source of the people's rights, but as a
proclamation of the rights inherent in everyone.69 "The choice in the
Bill of Rights of the word 'person' rather than 'citizen' was not fortuitous;
nor was the absence of a geographical limitation. Both reflect a
commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings.""0
The privilege against coerced self-incrimination "reflects the
Constitution's concern for the essential values represented by 'our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality .... "' To restrict the
availability of the Bill of Rights to United States citizens, to be miserly
with respect to such inalienable rights, would dilute the lofty ambitions
of the Framers of the Constitution.
1. The Text of the Fifth Amendment. A short textual exegesis reveals
the broad scope of Fifth Amendment protections, and thus, that they
fully encompass nonresident aliens. The relevant text of the Fifth
Amendment says, "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself"' 2 and the Supreme Court has said
that the text "must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit."'
Thus, the text in unequivocal and plain language states that the
protection is available "in any criminal case."74 It does not restrict itself
to trials involving citizens nor does it detail any geographical limits, as
it could easily have done. Through the use of the language "no person
shall," the text states that all persons in a criminal case may invoke the
Amendment's protection. The Framers did not limit the right against
coerced self-incrimination to citizens or any other distinct group.
Therefore, to give the text its plain meaning, we must read "any" as
"any" and "no person" as "no person."
2. The History of the Fifth Amendment. The history behind the Fifth
Amendment supports its characterization as a natural right. When the
68. "It may be said, in some instances, [the Bill of Rights does] no more than state the
perfect equality of mankind. This, to be sure, is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely
necessary to be inserted at the head of the Constitution." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (remarks of Madison in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789).
69. John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations
to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 297 (1985).
70. Louis Henkin, The Constitution As Compact and As Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 32 (1985).
71. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,416 (1966) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Framers of the Bill of Rights penned the Fifth Amendment protection
against compelled self-incrimination, they were conscious of the history
of government oppression of the individual, a history largely forgotten
today.' Justice Story noted that Roman jurists disapproved of the
practice of using torture to coerce confessions,76 and scholars interpret
the Magna Carta to proscribe the extortion of confessions."
Additionally, the abolition in 1641 of the Star Chamber in the United
Kingdom, which served as the judicial arm of the Privy CouncilF and
routinely drew confessions out of the accused by means of torture, set
the stage for the adoption of the privilege.' By 1776, the privilege
against self-incrimination was firmly rooted in our legal system.
B. Social Compact Theory Rejected
In Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist used principles
grounded in social compact theory to deny constitutional protections to
nonresident aliens. However, Justice Story first cast doubt on social
compact theory early in the nineteenth century.81 According to this
theory, the populace contract among themselves to create a body politic
before they establish a goverment. Thus, the government is not a
party to the original contract' Furthermore, the American citizenry
devised a government with limited powers and authority by way of the
United States Constitution; a government thereby created cannot exceed
75. See LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 9, at 258-59.
76. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSrTrTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 931
(Melville M. Bigelow, ed., 5th ed. Little Brown & Co. 1891).
77. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 9, at 262-63.
78. LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 9, at 49.
79. See id. at 41-42. It has been reported that some tortures involved "whipping,
pillorying, branding, nose-slitting and ear-severing." Id. at 100. See also SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES, supra note 65, at 137.
80. Perhaps Justice Fortas best described the effect of history on the development of the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause in his concurrence and partial dissent in United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967):
The privilege historically goes to the roots of democratic and religious principle. It
prevents the debasement of the citizen which would result from compelling him to
"accuse" himself before the power of the state. The roots of the privilege are deeper
than the rack and the screw used to extort confessions. They go to the nature of a
free man and his relationship to the state.
Id. at 261.
81. Story noted that "there is very strong negative testimony against the notion of [the
Constitution] being a compact... ." STORY, supra note 76, § 158, at 121. He also noted that "the
difficulty in asserting [the Constitution] to be a compact.., is, that the Constitution itself
contains no such expression, and no such designation of parties." Id. § 365, at 265.
82. Doernberg, supra note 46, at 60.
83. Id. at 60-61.
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those limited grants of power." Thus, in order to determine the extent
of governmental authority, recourse should be made to the Constitution,
not to a fictional social contract. In other words, since the social contract
is silent on the powers of government because it was made between and
among the people, it is irrelevant to a determination of the government's
authority. "Though useful for understanding the creation of our
government, the contract metaphor of the Constitution is incomplete and
distorts the true nature of the Constitution."' Second, reliance on the
social compact theory to determine the extent of governmental authority
improperly dilutes the effect of the natural rights doctrine in the
development of the Constitution. A revision of the social compact can
take away whatever that compact originally granted. "This way lies the
danger of downgrading rights to privileges, and that is not what the Bill
of Rights was intended to achieve."'
Third, restricting the reach of constitutional protections to citizens
and resident aliens by applying social compact theory to exclude
nonresident aliens ignores people who differ only because they were
born outside the United States and choose to reside outside the United
States. Assuming arguendo that the Constitution itself was part of the
social compact, it is not necessarily true that persons who are not parties
to a contract, such as nonresident aliens, cannot avail themselves of the
benefits of its protectionY Furthermore, social compact theory cannot
explain why a person who is not a party to the contract cannot seek
protection under the United States Constitution.' In the debate in
Congress over the Alien Act of 1798, James Madison, the father of our
Bill of Rights, argued:
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution,
as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they actually conform to it, they
have no right to its protection ... it will not be disputed, that as they
owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled in return
to their protection and advantage.'
Even if social compact theory is applied in Yunis as it was in
Verdugo, nonresident aliens should still receive the benefit of the Fifth
Amendment. While construing the reach of the Fourth Amendment
84. See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME CouRT 13-15 (1969).
85. George E. Collins, Recent Development, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 827, 836 (1990).
86. Vaughan Lowe, Self-Evident and Inalienable Rights Stop at the US Frontier, 5o CAMBRIDGE
LJ. 16, 19 (1991).
87. The intended beneficiaries of a contract can enforce its provisions even if they are not
parties to the original contract. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.5, at 734-35 (1982).
88. David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACr 208, 223 (Ernest Barker
ed., 1948).
89. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLiOT'S DEBATES 546, 556 (2d ed.
1836).
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narrowly so as not to apply to nonresident aliens, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the "text, by contrast with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, extends its reach only to 'the people, '"' ° which Chief
Justice Rehnquist equates with citizens and certain resident aliens.91 To
give meaning to that passage, the Fifth Amendment must then apply a
broader formulation that necessarily includes nonresident aliens since it
refers to "no person."
C. The Cases Underlying the Minimalist Theory Should Be Read
Narrowly
In order to give the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled
self-incrimination the meaning it deserves, the cases supporting the
minimalist approach should be read narrowly. The historical context of
several of the major cases in this area has changed significantly, reducing
the precedential value of their holdings. The consular court system,
from which In re Ross arose, is no longer in existence,' and the case is
plainly at odds with more recent decisions, like Curtiss-Wright, that
admit at least some extraterritorial application of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Johnson v. Eisentrager concerned a special kind of
defendant, the enemy alien 3 The defendants in Johnson had violated
the laws of war during World War l,94 and the Court took great pains
to dwell on the differences between the rights of enemy and friendly
aliens.95 It was the existence of war between the United States and the
alien's homeland, not their alienage, which reduced the enemy alien's
rights.9' This reduction was justified because of the need to ensure war
time security.' The United States is not presently at war with another
nation, and it is when the nonresident alien's nation "takes up arms
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
91. See id. at 265.
92. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1956). As Justice Black explained:
The Ross approach... is obviously erroneous if the United States government, which
has no power except that granted by the Constitution, can and does try citizens for
crimes committed abroad. Thus, the Ross case rested .. .on a fundamental
misconception and the most that can be said in support of the result reached there
is that the consular court jurisdiction had a long history antedating the adoption of
the Constitution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
93. The Court defined an enemy alien as "the subject of a foreign state at war with the
United States." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950).
94. Id. at 765-66.
95. Id. at 769-77.
96. See id. at 772-73.
97. See id. at 774.
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against us" that the alien loses the protection of the Constitution."
While there may be wars on drugs or terrorism now, such campaigns are
not the type envisioned by the holding in Johnson.
Finally, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez should not be read broadly
because the majority's rationale received only four votes and its
discussion of the Fifth Amendment issue only amounts to dicta. Justice
Kennedy rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of the social compact
rationale in the plurality opinion by stating that the absence of a juridical
relationship between the United States and "some undefined, limitless
class of noncitizens who are beyond our territory... does not depend
on the idea that only a limited class of persons ratified" the
Constitution.99 He rejected the entire social compact idea as "irrelevant
to any construction of the powers conferred or the limitations imposed"
by the Constitution.1°° According to Kennedy, "[t]he force of the
Constitution is not confined because it was brought into being by certain
persons who gave their immediate assent to its terms."10 1
Justice Stevens explicitly refused to join the plurality's "sweeping
opinion" ° because, although he agreed that the search of Verdugo-
Urquidez' home in Mexico did not violate the Fourth Amendment, he
rejected the use of social compact theory: "In my opinion aliens who are
lawfully present in the United States are among those 'people' who are
entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth
Amendment."' Verdugo-Urquidez was lawfully present in the
United States because United States agents arrested him under the color
of United States law."°
There were three dissents in Verdugo-Urquidez. Justices Brennan and
Marshall delivered a blistering attack in which they opposed the
plurality rationale point for point.0 5 Justice Blackmun wrote an
equally forceful dissent, stating that "the enforcement of domestic
criminal law seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of sovereignty
over those who are compelled to obey."'
98. Id. at 771.
99. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1990) (Kennedy, J.
concurring).
100. Id. at 276.
101. Justice Kennedy based his concurrence in the judgment on practical considerations.
Id. at 278.
102. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J. concurring).
103. Id.
104. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). United
States courts can exercise jurisdiction lawfully over nonresident alien defendants under the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine which states that a court's jurisdiction over a defendant "is not impaired by the
fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction.'"
Frisbie, 342 US. at 522.
105. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279.
106. Id. at 297.
Spring 19921
380 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
D. Constitutional Constraints On Government Action
1. Separation of Powers. The Constitution grants the branches of
federal government their respective power and limits their actionsY'17
The Supreme Court recognized this fundamental truth in 1886. "The
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances .... "'o In Ex
parte Milligan, the Court upheld President Lincoln's recision of the writ
of habeas corpus, a vital right, during the Civil War. The Court pointed
to times of national crisis as a justification for taking such extraordinary
action."° The Bill of Rights, on the other hand, "generally control[s]
the United States government in the conduct of its foreign relations...
and generally limit[s] governmental authority whether it is exercised in
the United States or abroad. . ,"" Thus, the Bill of Rights does not
condone extraconstitutional action outside of the United States.
Extending the self-incrimination privilege to nonresident alien
defendants in United States courts would not raise separation of powers
concerns between the judiciary and the executive branch in the area of
foreign affairs. While it is recognized that the executive branch is wholly
responsible for conducting foreign relations," extending the reach of
the protection against compelled self-incrimination does not encroach on
its authority. Furthermore, this extension would not affirmatively order
the president to do anything; granting the protection against self-
incrimination to nonresident alien defendants would only prohibit the
use of a coerced confession at trial. It would remain in the government's
discretion to risk suppression of a confession by not informing the
defendant of his or her rights.
2. Practicality of Applying the Constitution Overseas. The practicalities
involved in extending the Fifth Amendment protection to nonresident
aliens are significant to this discussion.
[A] constitutional privilege does not disappear, nor even lose its normal
vitality simply because its use may hinder law enforcement activities.
That is a consequence of nearly all the protections of the Bill of Rights,
107. "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1956).
108. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
109. Id. at 125.
110. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 721.
111. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 UhS. 304, 319 (1936).
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and a consequence that was originally and ever since deemed justified
by the need to protect individual rights.'
However, where the effect is to chill law enforcement and render it
practically impossible, the Supreme Court has refused to extend a
provision in the Constitution extraterritorially."
The Supreme Court in Ross considered the practicality of extending
the rights of grand jury indictment and petit jury trial overseas."" It
found that an extension of those rights would make prosecution
impractical due to the inability to find suitable jurors."'5 Such
impracticality would "cause an abandonment of all prosecution" and
"defeat the main purpose of investing the consul with judicial
authority.""6 The Johnson Court also considered the practicalities of
extending the right of habeas corpus to enemy aliens."" If habeas
corpus rights applied to nonresident enemy aliens, the Court reasoned
that our military would be forced to transport, house, guard, and feed
them."8 Witnesses, attorneys, and others central to such a defendant's
case would also need transport and the United States military would
have to provide it."9 The logistical problems this would impose,
especially in the midst of world war, are obvious. "Such trials would
hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy." "
Finally, the Court noted that it was unlikely that enemy states would
reciprocate and allow United States prisoners of war the same right.2
Issues of practicality also were part of the Fourth Amendment
analysis in Verdugo-Urquidez.m Because many overseas United States
government operations might require searches and seizures, extending
the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially would have "significant and
deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities
beyond its boundaries."" The Court was concerned about potential
damages suits against the United States government for violations of the
Fourth Amendment overseas. 24
Furthermore, the Court cited the practical problem of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. A warrantless search requires a
112. In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972).
113. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text
114. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 464-65.
117. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 779.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 274.
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showing of either consent or exigent circumstances." Thus, the ability
of United States agents to conduct searches on foreign soil would be
limited because of the unresolved issue of which country's magistrates
could authorize the search.' Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote
in that case, stating that the extension of the Fourth Amendment
overseas would be "impractical and anomalous.""
The extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment would not
create the practical problems that generated concern in Johnson v.
Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez. The acts committed in violation of the
Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination occur
when the United States has already exercised jurisdiction over a
nonresident alien defendant by way of arresting and detaining him or
her. Once the defendant is under the control of United States agents, it
should not matter where he or she is. As long as the defendant is under
the control of United States agents, the agents should be obligated to to
follow the simple constitutional procedures attending the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
E. Goals Behind the Fifth Amendment Protection Require Its Extension
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission laid out the basic rationales of the
Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination."
The Court found that the privilege against self-incrimination
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring
the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load;" our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life."' a
125. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, §§ 6.4-6 (2d ed. 1987).
126. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 278 (citing Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid, 354 U.S. at 74).
128. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964).
129. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
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By refusing the nonresident alien protection under the Fifth Amendment,
he or she is put in just the "cruel trilemma" that the privilege seeks to
avoid.' 3°
In addition, refusing Fifth Amendment protection to a nonresident
alien undercuts the inherent principles of the United States adversarial
system. Protection against compelled self-incrimination is a central
feature and a necessary part of the accusatory system."' Any denial
of this protection would upset the balance of the criminal justice system
by not providing adequate disincentives to the government's use of
coercion. United States agents acting abroad would not be dissuaded
from coercing a confession out of a defendant or using it to gain a
conviction at trial. Furthermore, foreign agents could coerce the
nonresident alien defendant into confessing which could later be used
against him or her in a United States trial. The Fifth Amendment
precludes the government from taking these short cuts to conviction. 32
Such short cuts via compelled self-incrimination only erode the integrity
of the criminal justice system by substantially easing the government's
difficulty in meeting its burden of proof. 33
District courts have authority to use their supervisory power to deny
jurisdiction in egregious cases to avoid becoming "accomplices in the
willful disobedience of the law."34 For example, the Second Circuit
refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant when
the government acted egregiously." In United States v. Toscanino, paid
agents of the United States government' tortured the defendant, an
Italian citizen, in Brasilia, Brazil. 37 The United States government and
the United States attorney in charge of the case were aware and received
regular reports of the interrogation and torture.36 The court disagreed
with the government's argument that the Bill of Rights does not
constrain its overseas actions against aliens saying that the Fifth
Amendment "protects 'people' and not 'areas'. . . or 'citizens." 
39
Similarly, jurists caution the Executive not to engage. in
extraconstitutional acts to forward criminal justice. In Olmstead v. United
130. Id.
131. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 9, at 260.
132. In Murphy, the Court noted the importance of "requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load .... " Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citing 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 317 (revised 1961).
133. Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 193,208-10.
134. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
135. Id.
136. The agents were not United States citizens but were agents of the Montevideo,
Uruguay police force. Id. at 269.
137. Id. at 269-70.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 280 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
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States,'" the Court ruled that wire-tapping did not violate a defendant's
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination or Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure."l
Dissenting, Justices Holmes and Brandeis characterized the use of
evidence gained by wire-tapping as illegal.'" Under this rationale, it
can be assumed that these Justices would also find a coerced confession,
a violation which reaches to the roots of both the theoretical and
historical underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment, to be equally
repugnant.'"
If the United States is serious about upholding the fundamental
principles enshrined in the Constitution, its protections against self-
incrimination must be afforded to the accused despite his or her
nationality. To suggest that the United States, in peacetime, should
adjust its respect for a person's dignity according to his or her nationality
or place of arrest dearly ignores these principles.
E International Law as Further Support for Fifth Amendment
Extraterritorial Application
Together, the United Nations Charter (Charter),'" the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), 6 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant),1 47 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'" form
the International Bill of Rights." These documents provide evidence
that a right against coerced self-incrimination exists in international law.
United States courts are obligated to give effect to international
law."s  The United States is a charter member of the United
140. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
141. Id. at 462-66.
142. Id. at 464-65.
143. "[The Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a
criminal act." Id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Reiterating this point in a particularly
scathing dissent, Justice Brandeis said, "To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution." Id. at 485
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
144. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
145. U.N. CHARTER.
146. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Declaration].
147. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter Covenant].
148. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
This Covenant, however, is not relevant to the present discussion.
149. See MYRs S. MCDOUGAL Er AL., HUmAN RIGHITS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 321-22
(1980).
150. As the U.S. Supreme Court said nearly a hundred years ago: "[flnternational law is
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Nations' and also voted in favor of the Declaration.' Further, the
United States has signed the Covenant." Both the Declaration and the
Covenant codify and explain the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter. Together they form a part of the formidable
transnational human rights jurisprudence now growing.
Furthermore, international law is part of the federal law of the
United States. Thus, it is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
which are bound to give it effect." In addition to looking to
international agreements as a source of international law," courts may
look to customary international law, or principles of jus cogens5 6 which
are norms that are virtually nonderogable"
1. Self-Incrimination, Jus Cogens, and the Supreme Court. The protection
of human rights is an obligatory legal norm." The United Nations
owes its existence in part to a recognition of this norm. The member
states joined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small . . . ."'5 Thus, the United
Nations Charter's "basic provisions, constituting the jus cogens, the
practically immutable law of the international community, are broad in
scope and sufficiently flexible to permit their interpretation to be
adjusted to the needs of each generation." " In short, human rights
and their protection are central features of the United Nations
Charter.161
part of our law, and it must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
151. U.N. CHARTER.
152. Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 367, 371 n. 18 (1985).
153. M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS
1967 (1984). The United States Senate recently gave its advice and consent to the Covenant.
138 CONG. REc. S4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
154. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 111.
155. IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (4th ed. 1990).
156. Id. at 4.
157. See generally id. at 509-17.
158. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 1970 I.C.J.
3, 301 (Feb. 5) (citing the South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.Cj. 4, 300 (July 18) (Tanaka, J.,
dissenting)).
159. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The Charter later returns to the protection of human rights.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55. ("[Tihe United Nations shall promote... universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all ...."); U.N. CHARTER art. 56
("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action.., for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55.").
160. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1982).
161. Paul Sieghart, International Human Rights Law: Some Current Problems, in HUMAN
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Through the Declaration and the Covenant, the Charter's provisions
on human rights are codified and explained. 62 Article 10 of the
Declaration states: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him."'" Here, the Declaration grants a broad right to a fair
criminal trial applicable to all people. A distinction based on nationality
may not be made without upsetting the Article 10 guarantee of "full
equality."
A fair criminal trial is further defined in the Covenant. Articles 14
and 15 offer a comprehensive description of a defendant's trial rights.
Article 14 states that in criminal trials "everyone shall be entitled to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality."' 64 Article 14(3)(g)
explicitly affirms a defendant's right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt.""6 The right against compelled self-
incrimination and the later use of those statements is available to
"everyone;" the Covenant does not distinguish between defendants
according to their nationality.
The United Nations consistently relies on the Declaration in
interpreting the Charter's human rights provisions166 because it
considers the Declaration to be an authoritative and binding
interpretation of the Charter.67 The Declaration has now "become the
accepted general articulation of recognized rights." 68 The
overwhelming endorsement given to the Universal Declaration by the
United Nations, national, and other transnational bodies has led several
provisions to have the status of jus cogens.169
Similarly, the Preamble to the Covenant explicitly refers to both the
Declaration and the United Nations Charter. 70 It offers an
authoritative and detailed interpretation of Article 10. Those provisions
of the Covenant that set forth human rights norms are "to a large extent,
declaratory of the law of the Charter." 1' Since Articles 14 and 15 of
RIGHTS FOR THE 1990S at 24,27 (Robert Blackburn & John Taylor eds., 1991).
162. BROWNLIE, supra note 155, at 699.
163. Declaration, supra note 146, art. 10, at 73.
164. Covenant, supra note 147, art. 14, at 54.
165. Id.
166. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 35 (1963); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 701 rep. note 4; MCDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 149, at 274.
167. BROWNLIE, supra note 155, at 570-71; MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 149, at 325; Jeffrey
M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 69 (1981).
168. 2 RESTATEMENT (THI ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 701 rep. note 6.
169. McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 149, at 274.
170. Covenant, supra note 147, pmbl, at 49.
171. M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Introduction: Human Rights: The United Nations and United
States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INTL L.J. 813, 817 (1978).
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the Covenant can be seen to be based in the United Nations Charter,
they provide evidence that they represent norms of jus cogens.i' As
these norms can be considered jus cogens,'7 which are virtually
nonderogable, there is even greater impetus for their incorporation into
the United States Constitution.
The foregoing analysis evidences the great degree to which human
rights are protected under both the United States Constitution and the
United Nations Charter. 74 It is of tremendous assistance in
determ*ing the proper scope of the extraterritoriality of the Bill of
Rights. It would be "unrealistic to ignore the influence . . . of the
Charter [and other authoritative international instruments as factors] in
resolving constitutional issues that have hitherto been in doubt."7" For
these reasons, the Supreme Court should recognize these norms and
incorporate them into the Constitution.
2. Customary International Law in United States Courts. The right against
compelled self-incrimination is at least a norm of customary international
law and should be enforced in United States courts, notwithstanding the
nationality of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding his or
her arrest. Although norms of customary international law are more
easily derogable than the norms of jus cogens, norms of jus cogens, like
customary international law, are part of the law of the United States. 76
The Declaration is accepted in toto as evidence of customary
172. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 167, at 70-71 (citing the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 18, 8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969)) (The Covenant has its basis in the United
Nations Charter, and thus it binds all United Nations members, whether they have ratified or
merely signed the Covenant.).
Article 18 of the Convention states:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty....
Vienna Convention, supra, art. 18, 8 I.L.M. at 686. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
of the U.S. considers the Vienna Convention as a codification of customary international law
governing treaties. See 1 RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, § 102 cmt.
f.
173. Sohn, supra note 160, at 32.
174. Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law,
3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 76 (1990).
175. Lillich, supra note 152, at 408. "[A] growing number of federal and state courts have
referred explicitly to the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration, or other international human
rights instruments in order to determine the content and contours of various rights guaranteed
by United States law." Lillich, The United States Constitution, supra note 174, at 76.
176. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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international law by some commentators." Even the United Nations
General Assembly has implied that the Declaration's provisions
"constitute basic principles of international law.""m  Because of this
broad acceptance of the Declaration as an authoritative interpretation of
the United Nations Charter provisions on human rights, the Declaration
may be considered "international customary law, binding on all states,
not only on members of the United Nations.""'
Perhaps more importantly, the Declaration is treated as customary
international law in practice." It is "cited so often in international
resolutions and accords and in learned texts that it is now regarded as
part of customary international law."8' In the forty years since its
adoption, neither the Declaration nor its substantive contents have ever
been challenged." In fact many nations born since the adoption of the
Declaration "have incorporated all or some of [the Declaration's] contents
into their national constitutions. " "
In United States and foreign courts, the Declaration has been drawn
upon as a source of customary international law.M United States
courts decided two notable cases by reference to the Declaration as
customary international law. Specifically, in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,'"
a Kansas District Court found a prohibition in customary international
law against indeterminate detention and stated that the Declaration is
"an important source of international human rights."'" In Filartiga v.
Pefa-Irala.187 the Second Circuit found a prohibition against torture in
customary international law, and cited the Declaration as a source,"
observing that the Declaration "no longer fits into the dichotomy of
binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement, but is rather an
authoritative statement of the international community."e
Commentators argue that the Covenant is also part of customary
international law." While more controversial than the Declaration, the
177. See HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 1990S, supra note 161, at 29; McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note
149, at 325, 328-30.
178. GA. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971).
179. Sohn, supra note 160, at 17.
180. Andrew M. Wolfenson, Note, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted
Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 713 n.41 (1989-90)(citing NIGEL S.
RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (1987)).
181. Jerome J. Shestack, The World Had a Dream, HUM. RTs., Summer 1988, at 18.
182. HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 1990s, supra note 161, at 29.
183. Id.
184. BROWNLUE, supra note 155, at 570 n.74.
185. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
186. Id. at 797.
187. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
188. Id. at 882.
189. Id. at 883.
190. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms,
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Covenant is at least in the process of becoming part of customary
international law, and thus, is an important source of those norms."
Both Filartiga and Fernandez cited the Covenant as a source of customary
international law."9  Furthermore, the Covenant is, arguably, an
authoritative interpretation of the Declaration which would make its
provisions a firm source of customary international law. Finally, Articles
14 and 15 of the Covenant can be read as codifying Article 10 of the
Dedaration.' 9
3
V. CONCLUSION
The extraterritoriality of the Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination remains to be settled. In re Ross, though
practically overruled by Reid v. Covert, could be resurrected under the
auspices of the social compact theory espoused in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez.'" Or, Verdugo-Urquidez's social compact theory
could be expanded to further restrict the extraterritorial reach of the
entire Bill of Rights. Reid could be read narrowly as applying only to
citizens overseas, as in Verdugo-Urquidez'95 or it could be overruled
outright. Finally, Johnson v. Eisentrager could be read expansively to
encompass all aliens overseas and not just enemy aliens in time of war.
Or, the courts could put hijackers and terrorists into the classification of
enemy aliens under Johnson v. Eisentrager.
However, it is fundamentally unfair to deny nonresident aliens the
protections of at least the rights essential to a fair trial. "The Framers,
who fought to protect inalienable rights, could hardly have intended for
the government to ignore the Constitution when acting abroad.""
The protections in our Bill of Rights, like the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination, are norms that cut across national
boundaries and rest on the philosophy of natural rights.97 These
protections have lasted for two centuries and should not now be pruned
back beyond the intent of the Framers.
The federal government obtains jurisdiction over an alien via the
Constitution. However, refusing an alien the benefit of the Fifth
Amendment at trial creates an anomaly in which that same Constitution
27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 42 (1990) (citing Professor Thomas Franck).
191. See Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL 601, 630 (1990).
192. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 797. The Court in Fernandez
referred to the Covenant's provisions as "indicia of the customs and usages of civilized
nations." Id. at 797.
193. Covenant, supra note 147, arts. 14-15, at 54-55.
194. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
196. Dobson, supra note 56, at 130.
197. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
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offers no protective rights. The United States does not give nonresident
aliens an opportunity to participate in law-making, yet it is expected that
they follow certain provisions of United States laws when they are
beyond United States territory.'9 ' Finally, the human rights protections
offered by international law are steadily increasing.'" The purpose of
the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was to
establish a world-wide regime in which certain fundamental human
rights apply despite one's nationality and without regard to national
boundaries.' Extending the Bill of Rights overseas complements the
increasing trend in international law to protect the rights of individuals
and bring the United States into line with the family of nations.
Once sharp delimiters, national boundaries are becoming
increasingly permeable. "The proper reach... of the Constitution has
far less to do with formalistic notions of territory than with choices
regarding the importance attached to the values" that it embodies.2
While the United States courts are not in a position to secure the rights
of all people everywhere, they do have an obligation to respect an
individual's rights without regard to nationality.
Bryan William Horn
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